We use a dynamic programming model to study the impacts of risk aversion on information acquisition in technology adoption decisions. In this model, the benefit of the technology is uncertain and, in each period, the decision maker (DM) may adopt the technology, reject the technology, or pay to acquire a signal about the benefit of the technology. The dynamic programming state variables are the DM's wealth and a probability distribution that describes the DM's beliefs about the benefit of the technology; these distributions are updated over time using Bayes' rule. If the signal generating process satisfies the monotone-likelihood ratio property and the DM is risk neutral, the value functions and policies satisfy natural monotonicity properties: a likelihood-ratio improvement in the distribution on benefits leads to an increase in the value function and moves the DM away from rejection and towards adoption. With risk aversion, the value functions (now representing expected utilities) will be monotonic, but the policies need not be monotonic, even with reasonable utility functions. However, if we assume the DM exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion and is not "too risk averse," the policies can be shown to be monotonic. Establishing these structural properties requires the use of some novel proof techniques that may prove useful in other contexts. We also study the impact of changing risk attitudes on the optimal policy. 
Introduction
New technologies often promise uncertain benefits, sometimes with high costs. For example, consider the Tesla Model S luxury electric sedan. The Tesla boasts outstanding styling, performance, and efficiency (with a miles-per-gallon-equivalent of 84 miles per gallon) and earned an incredible 99 out of a possible 100 points in Consumer Reports' automobile ratings. However, as a new car, the Tesla's reliability is uncertain and its price tag ($70-100,000) will give most consumers pause. Even among consumers who can afford a Tesla, many will wait to see how the car performs over the next few years to see if its benefits justify its cost. Similar dilemmas are faced by a farmer considering planting a new variety of soybeans or corn, an electric utility considering building a power plant based on a new technology, or a doctor contemplating changing treatment protocols. Should they act now or wait and learn more before deciding?
In this paper, we study the impact of uncertainty about the benefits of a technology on adoption and information gathering decisions, under risk aversion. Our starting point is the dynamic programming (DP) model studied in Ulu and Smith (2009, hereafter US) , which builds on and generalizes the classic model of McCardle (1985) . In this model, in each period, the decision maker (DM) must decide whether to adopt or reject a new technology or to wait and gather additional information about the benefits of the technology.
Information gathering is costly and modeled as receiving a signal (e.g., a new review) about the benefit of the technology. After observing a signal, the DM updates her distribution on the technology's benefits using Bayes' rule. In McCardle (1985) , the uncertainty in each period is described by a univariate summary statistic and consequently the DP has a univariate state variable. US (2009) considers a general model of learning where the state variable is the DM's probability distribution on the benefits of the technology; these probability distributions are ordered by likelihood-ratio (LR) dominance.
Our focus in this paper is on structural properties of the model and, in particular, the effects of risk aversion on these structural properties. Risk aversion is an important consideration in practice, particularly when the new technology (for example, the Tesla or the power plant) is expensive and when the stakes are high (a farmer's choice of variety to plant or doctor's choice of treatments) for the DM or stakeholders. Many of the structural properties of the model generalize naturally from the risk-neutral to the risk-averse case.
In particular, we can show the value functions are monotonic using essentially the same arguments as the risk-neutral case: if we assume the signal generating process satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio (MLR) property, LR improvements in the prior lead to an increase the DM's expected utility. Convexity and some other comparative statics and convergence results also generalize in a straightforward manner to the risk averse case.
However, the structure of the optimal policy is harder to characterize with risk aversion. If the DM is risk neutral or risk seeking, we can show that the optimal policy is monotonic in that if it is optimal to adopt (or reject) with one distribution, it is optimal to adopt (reject) with all distributions that LR-dominate (or are LR-dominated by) the first distribution. This is shown using a supermodularity argument: the expected values for different actions have LR-increasing differences. Under risk aversion, the corresponding utility differences need not be LR-increasing and the optimal policies need not be monotonic, even for reasonable utility functions. For example, we may have a DM for whom it is optimal to wait and gather more information about the technology with one prior distribution but optimal to adopt with a worse (i.e., a LR-dominated)
prior. But, if we assume that the utility functions exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion and are not "too risk averse" (in a sense to be made precise later), we can show that these policy differences are "sLRincreasing." This sLR-increasing property is sufficient to ensure that the utility differences are single crossing and the policies are monotonic, as in the risk-neutral case. Though the main contribution of the paper is the study of risk aversion in the technology adoption problem, this s-increasing property may prove useful when studying other DP models.
We provide a brief review of related literature in the remainder of this section. In §2, we describe the model and introduce a numerical example that we will use to illustrate the results of the paper. In §3, we briefly review some key properties of LR-dominance and LR-increasing functions. In §4, we present several results for the risk-averse model that are straightforward generalizations of the risk-neutral model. In §5, we study the structure of the policies in the risk-neutral and risk-averse models and show how risk aversion can lead to non-monotonic policies. In §6, we develop the idea of s-increasing and sLR-increasing functions and show that s-increasing properties are preserved and propagated in recursive Bayesian models. In §7, we show that if the DM is not too risk averse, the policy differences will be sLR-increasing which implies the optimal policies will be monotonic under risk aversion. In §8, we study the effects of changing risk attitudes on the optimal values and policies. In §9, we consider the model with discounting.
Literature Review
The literature on technology adoption is vast and spans a number of fields; Rogers (2003) provides a thorough review of the early literature. As discussed earlier, we focus on information acquisition in technology adoption decisions, following McCardle (1985) and US (2009) . Jensen (1982) earlier studied a technology model where the uncertain technology value could take on just two values (low or high). There have been a number of other generalizations and variations on McCardle's (1985) model. For example, Lippman and McCardle (1987) study how changes in the "informational returns to scale" in the McCardle (1985) model affect the timing of adoption decisions. Cho and McCardle (2009) study information acquisition in technology decisions when there are multiple dependent technologies. McCardle (1985) 's model can also be viewed as a variation on the sequential hypothesis testing problem studied in Wald (1945) where the uncertainty is the economic benefit associated with adopting the technology, rather than the truth of posited null and alternative hypotheses.
Of course, risk aversion and information gathering are central themes in decision analysis. LaValle (1968) provides an early study of the value of information with risk aversion; see also the review in Hilton (1981) . The conclusions in this literature are mostly negative: e.g., there is no monotonic relationship between the degree of absolute or relative risk aversion and the value of information (Hilton (1981) , Theorem 2). Others have made progress focusing on specific problems. For example, Bickel (2008) studies a single-period two-action linear-loss problem (essentially accept a risk or reject it) with exponential utility, focusing on the case with normally distributed uncertainties. Abbas et al. (2013) also studies the effects of risk aversion on the value of information in a single-period problem with two actions; they find that the value of imperfect information may increase or decrease with the DM's degree of risk aversion. Here we consider a dynamic version of the two-action problem with repeated opportunities for information gathering. We consider general utilities and provide conditions that lead to some positive results about the structure of information gathering policies.
Risk aversion is also of growing interest in the broader operations research and operations management literature. For example, Eeckhoudt et al. (1995) studied the impact of risk aversion in the classic newsvendor problem. Similarly, Chen et al. (2007) studied the impact of risk aversion in classic dynamic inventory management models, focusing on structural properties of the models. Zhu and Kapuscinski (2015) studies a multiperiod, multinational risk averse newsvendor facing exchange rate risks. The latter two studies use a present certainty equivalent framework (Smith (1998) ) that assumes an exponential utility function and leads to tractable DP models; Eeckhoudt et al. (1995) considers a more general utility analysis but in a single period setting. Our paper is analogous to these in that we study the effects of incorporating risk aversion in a classic model in the operations research literature.
Finally, this paper builds on and contributes to the vast literature on structural properties of DPs. Smith and McCardle (2002) synthesizes some of these structural property results for DPs and relates these results to stochastic dominance. Lovejoy (1987b) and Lovejoy (1987a) provide sufficient conditions for monotonic policies for DPs and partially observable DPs, exploiting super/submodularity results (e.g., Topkis (1978) ).
As mentioned above, these super/submodularity arguments do not work in the technology adoption model with risk aversion. Milgrom and Shannon (1994) shows that single-crossing policy differences are sufficient to obtain monotone policies, though they focus on single-period problems rather than DPs (see also Athey (2002) and Quah and Strulovici (2009) ). As we will see, the s-increasing property is convenient for use with DP models and enables the use of single-crossing results to establish the monotonicity of policies.
The Model
In this section, we begin by describing the general model. We then present a specific numerical example that we will use to illustrate our later results.
A DM is contemplating purchasing a new technology which yields an uncertain benefit denoted by θ ∈ Θ ⊆ R;
we can think of θ as representing the net present value of the stream of benefits provided by the technology. The DM's beliefs about the benefit of the technology are described by a probability distribution. For ease of notation, we will assume the DM's probability distribution is continuous and has a density π over Θ. For discrete spaces, we can interpret π as a probability mass function and consider sums instead of integrals; more general probability measures could also be considered.
Time is discrete. In each period, the DM starts with a prior distribution π and must choose whether to adopt the technology, reject it, or gather additional information:
• If she adopts the technology, she receives an uncertain benefit θ with distribution π.
2
• If she rejects the technology, she receives nothing and stops gathering information.
• If she waits and gathers additional information, she pays c (c > 0) in that period and observes a signal x ∈ X, drawn with likelihood function L(x|θ). After observing signal x, the DM proceeds to the next period with a new distribution on benefits Π(θ; π, x) given by updating the prior π using Bayes' rule,
where f (x; π) is the predictive distribution for signals x, f (x; π) = θ L(x|θ)π(θ) dθ. We will assume L(x|θ) > 0 for all x and θ; this ensures that the predictive distributions satisfy f (x; π) > 0 and the posterior distributions Π(θ; π, x) are well defined for all signals x.
We will write the posterior distribution as Π(π, x) when we want to consider the posterior as a function of the prior π and observed signal x. Similarly we will write the predictive distribution for signals as f (π).
Let u(w) denote the DM's utility function for wealth w. The DM's value function (or derived utility function) with k periods remaining and prior π, U k (w, π), can be written recursively as:
Here, when waiting, the DM observes a random signalx, updates her prior π to posterior Π(π,x) after seeing the signal, and continues to the next period with her wealth reduced by the cost c of gathering information.
This formulation assumes there is no discounting of costs or benefits; we will discuss the extension to a model with discounting in §9. The expectations in (1) can be written more explicitly as
When writing expectations, we will place tildes on the random variable involved and condition the expectation on the distribution assumed for the random variable. To ensure these expectations are well defined, we will assume that u(w + θ) is π-integrable for all w and π encountered.
The DM is risk neutral if her utility function u(w) is linear, risk averse if u(w) is concave, and risk seeking if u(w) is convex. We let ρ u (w) = −u (w)/u (w) denote the coefficient of (absolute) risk aversion for utility function u and let τ u (w) = 1/ρ u (w) = −u (w)/u (w) be the risk tolerance. A utility function u(w) exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion (is DARA) if it is strictly increasing, concave (i.e., risk averse), twice differentiable and ρ u (w) is decreasing or, equivalently, τ u (w) is increasing. A utility function u 2 is more risk tolerant than utility function u 1 if τ u2 (w) ≥ τ u1 (w) for all w and is more risk averse if the reverse inequality holds. These are global notions of more or less risk averse DMs or utilities, as in Pratt (1964) .
An Illustrative Example
We will illustrate our results using a specific numerical example with a beta-Bernoulli model. We assume that the value of the technology is given by θ = p − 0.5 where the DM starts with a beta distribution on the parameter p; that is, π(p) ∝ p (α−1) (1 − p) (β−1) . We assume the waiting cost c is 0.01. Signals follow a Bernoulli process with positive (+) signals occurring with probability p and negative (−) signals with probability 1 − p. Applying Bayes' rule, if we start in one period with a beta prior with parameters (α, β),
we enter the next period with parameters (α + 1, β) if a positive signal is observed and with (α, β + 1) if a negative signal is observed. Thus, the precision (α + β) increases by one in each period. The mean of the beta distribution is given by α/(α+β) and the expected benefit of the technology is therefore α/(α+β)−0.5.
In this setting, rather than working with full distributions π as a state variable, we can instead work with (α, β) as the state variable or, equivalently, with the expected benefit of the technology and the precision of the distribution as state variables.
We first consider the case where the DM is risk neutral with u(w) = w; we will assume the initial wealth is equal to $1.06. (This initial wealth has no impact on the optimal policy given risk neutrality.) We will consider the infinite horizon limit, by taking the number of periods remaining to be very large. The optimal policy for this example is shown in Figure 1 (a). Here the x-axis corresponds to the precision (α + β) of the DM's distribution; the y-axis represents the expected benefit (α/(α + β) − 0.5). The DM's beliefs can be represented by a point in this figure and will move from left to right as the DM gathers information.
One such path is shown as the jagged line in the figure: this DM starts with α = 2.25 and β = 1.75 (thus precision α + β = 4) and observes a signal sequence (−, +, −, +, −, −), before rejecting the technology. In Figure 1 (a), we see that the adoption (rejection) thresholds decrease (increase) as the precision increases, converging toward θ = 0. is optimal to reject the technology. If the expected benefit is more than 0.03, it is optimal to adopt the technology. Between these two levels, it is optimal to wait and gather additional information. The optimal initial wealth $1.06 (as before) and has a power utility function u(w) = 1.2 − 0.2w (1−γ) where γ = 6 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, i.e., the DM's risk tolerance is one-sixth of her wealth, τ u (w) = w/6.
(The utility function is scaled so its value and slope match that of the risk-neutral utility function u(w) = w at w=1.0.) Examining the optimal policy regions in Figure 2 (a), we see that the risk-averse DM is more conservative in adopting (she requires a much higher expected benefit before adopting) and rejects in many scenarios where a risk-neutral DM would wait or adopt. In particular, on the example path in Figure 1 (a) where the DM starts with α = 2.25 and β = 1.75, the risk-averse DM would reject the technology after observing a single negative signal.
Figure 2(b) shows the expected utilities associated with adopting, waiting, and rejecting, in the same setting as Figure 1 (b). As in Figure 1(b) , it is optimal to reject for low expected benefits, optimal to adopt for high expected benefits, and optimal to wait between these two levels. Again, all of these functions are increasing in the expected benefit. The value given adoption is concave in the expected benefit, reflecting the DM's risk aversion. The optimal value function (the upper envelope) and the value with waiting are convex in the lower range and concave in the higher range, where adoption is optimal or likely in future periods.
Preliminaries
The example of the previous section illustrates the kinds of results that one might hope to establish as general properties of the technology adoption model and as general effects of risk aversion. To study monotonicity properties of the model, we will rely heavily on the likelihood-ratio order on distributions and the monotone likelihood-ratio property for the signal's likelihood functions. In this section, we briefly review these definitions and some important related properties.
Definition 3.1 (LR-dominance and related definitions).
(ii) A signal process has the monotone-likelihood-ratio (MLR) property if the signal space X is totally ordered and
Note that if π 1 (θ) > 0 for all θ, the condition defining LR-dominance is equivalent to π 2 (θ)/π 1 (θ) being increasing in θ. In the illustrative example of §2.2, increasing α in the beta prior while holding the precision The key properties of the LR-order that we will use are (i) LR-dominance implies first-order stochastic dominance; (ii) LR-dominance survives Bayesian updating and (iii) if the signal process satisfies the MLR property, the LR-order leads to natural monotonicity properties in signals. These properties are well known.
Proposition 3.1 (Properties of the LR-order).
(ii) Given any signal x, the posteriors are LR-ordered if and only if the priors are LR-ordered: that is,
(iii) If the signal process satisfies the MLR property, then
These properties of the LR-order imply that expectations of increasing functions generate LR-increasing functions and the LR-increasing property is preserved by Bayesian updating. These results are critical establishing monotonicity properties in the technology adoption model and will be generalized to s-increasing functions in §6.
Proposition 3.2 (Properties of LR-increasing functions).
(ii) Suppose the signal process satisfies the MLR property and V (π) is a LR-increasing function. Then
Here part (i) follows from Proposition 3.1(i) and the definition of LR-increasing. Part (ii) uses each element of Proposition 3.1; see US (2009), Lemma 3.5 for a proof.
As discussed in the introduction, we will consider single-crossing properties of policy differences and define single-crossing functions as follows.
Definition 3.2 (Single-crossing functions).
We note that single-crossing functions v(θ) generate LR-single-crossing functions V (π) in much the same way that increasing functions generate LR-increasing functions in Proposition 3.2(i).
Proposition 3.3 (Generating single-crossing functions
Proof. See, e.g., Karlin (1968) , Chapter 1, Theorem 3.1. (p. 21)
Straightforward Properties
A number of properties of the risk-neutral model generalize in a straightforward manner to the risk-sensitive model. In this section, we focus on the monotonicity and convexity results that we will use later and briefly mention some other properties.
Monotonicity of the Value Function
We first show that if the signal process satisfies the MLR property and the DM's utility function is increasing, the optimal value function is monotonic in that LR-improvements in the prior distribution π lead to higher values. The proof is analogous to the proof for the risk-neutral case (see Proposition 3.6 in US (2009)).
Proposition 4.1 (Monotonicity of the value function). Suppose the DM's utility function u(w) is increasing in w and the signal process satisfies the MLR property. Then, for all k and w, the value function
is LR-increasing in π.
Proof. We show this by induction. The terminal value function, U 0 (w, π) = u(w), is independent of π and thus trivially LR-increasing for all w. The value if the DM adopts (
The value if the DM rejects, u(w), is independent of π and trivially LR-increasing. Now suppose U k−1 (w, π) is LR-increasing for all w. By Proposition 3.2(ii), the value if the DM waits,
, as the maximum of three LR-increasing functions, is also LR-increasing.
As discussed following Definition 3.1, the signal process in the illustrative example satisfies the MLR property and movements to the right in Figures 1(b) and 2(b) correspond to LR-improvements in the prior. In these figures, it is evident -both with risk neutrality and with risk aversion -that the values corresponding to adopting, rejecting, and waiting are all increasing with such improvements, so the optimal value function (the upper envelope of these functions) is also increasing in this direction.
Convexity
Convexity in the priors π follows exactly as in the case with risk neutrality. Here we do not need to place any assumptions on the utility function (e.g., the utility function need not be increasing or concave) or on the signal process (e.g., the likelihood function need not satisfy the MLR property).
Proposition 4.2 (Convexity).
(i) For all k and w, the value function U k (w, π) is convex in π.
(ii) If it is optimal to adopt (reject) with priors π 1 and π 2 , then it is also optimal to adopt (reject) with
Proof. See US (2009) Propositions 6.2 and 6.3.
This convexity result follows from the fact that the expected utility associated with adoption is linear in the probabilities and can be interpreted as an aversion towards uncertainty about the prior π. The convex combination π α = απ 1 +(1−α)π 2 can be interpreted as there being an α chance of π 1 prevailing and a (1−α) chance of π 2 prevailing. A convex value function means that the DM would prefer to resolve this uncertainty before beginning the information-gathering process (for an expected utility of αU k (w,
rather than begin the information-gathering process with this uncertainty unresolved (for an expected utility of U k (w, π α )). Intuitively, if the DM knew whether π 1 or π 2 prevailed, she could make better adoption, rejection and/or information gathering decisions. 
Other Straightforward Extensions
In addition to these monotonicity and convexity results, a number of other results generalize in a straightforward manner from the risk-neutral to risk-averse model. We state a few of these results informally:
• Increasing the informativeness of the signal processes (in the sense of Blackwell (1951) ) makes the DM better off and encourages information gathering.
• Cheaper information (reducing c) makes the DM better off, encourages information gathering, and delays adoption.
• Increasing the number of periods remaining (k) makes the DM better off and encourages information gathering. However, there are diminishing returns to increasing the number of periods remaining:
-the expected utilities converge for all priors, and -if the utility function is strictly increasing, the DM will almost certainly stop gathering information at some point.
Here "makes the DM better off" means the value function (weakly) increases with the given change in assumptions and "encourages information gathering" means that if it is optimal to gather more information with the initial assumption it remains optimal to gather information with the change. These results are discussed in US (2009) and risk aversion does not play a significant role in the proofs or interpretation.
Monotonicity of the Policies
We next consider how the optimal policy responds to changes in the distribution on benefits. As discussed in the introduction, with risk neutrality, if the signal process satisfies the MLR property, we get monotonic policies as well as monotonic value functions: along any chain of LR-improving distributions, the optimal action moves from rejection towards adoption, perhaps passing through the information gathering region.
In the illustrative example, moving up in Figure 1 (a) or 2(a) corresponds to a LR-improvement and we can see that, in both the risk-neutral and risk-averse cases, the optimal policies are monotonic in this sense. The monotonicity of the rejection policy is easy to establish in both the risk-neutral and risk-averse models. The monotonicity of the adoption policy is more difficult to establish, and, as we demonstrate in §5.3 below, this monotonicity need not hold with risk aversion.
Rejection Policies
We want to show that if it is optimal to reject with π 2 , then it is also optimal to reject with π 1 whenever π 2 LR π 1 . Here we consider the difference between the optimal value and the value given by rejecting,
If it is optimal to reject given prior π 2 , we have U k (w, π 2 ) = u(w) and thus
If we assume that the DM's utility function is increasing and the signal process satisfies the MLR property, U k (w, π) is LR-increasing (by Proposition 4.1) and thus
since U k (w, π 1 ) corresponds to the optimal action and rejecting is a possible action, we know U k (w, π 1 ) ≥ u(w). Therefore U k (w, π 1 ) = u(w) and it is optimal to reject given π 1 as well. Thus the monotonicity of rejection policy follows under the same conditions required to ensure that value functions are LR-increasing.
Proposition 5.1 (Monotonicity of rejection policies). Suppose the DM's utility function is increasing and the signal process satisfies the MLR property. If it is optimal to reject with prior π 2 , it is also optimal to reject with any prior π 1 such that π 2 LR π 1 .
Adoption Policies
The monotonicity of the adoption policy is more difficult to establish because the optimal value and the value from adopting both potentially change with π.
difference between the value associated with immediate adoption and the optimal value function; note that
. (2) If we assume the DM is risk neutral or risk seeking, we can show the utility difference G k (w, π) is LRincreasing using a straightforward DP induction argument. First note that the terminal utility difference,
, is LR-increasing (this follows from Proposition 3.2(i)). The terms associated with adopting and rejecting in (2) are also LR-increasing. For the induction hypothesis, suppose
Now consider the "reward" associated with waiting in (2),
In the risk-neutral case with u(w) = w, this reward term reduces to a constant −c and is trivially LRincreasing. If the DM is risk seeking (i.e., the utility function is convex), the utility difference
is increasing in θ and the reward term (3) is LR-increasing (again, by Proposition 3.2(i)). The sum of two LR-increasing functions is LR-increasing, so adding the reward term (3) and the continuation value, we know that the term associated with waiting in (2) is LR-increasing. Thus, the functions associated with each choice in (2) are all LR-increasing. Then G k (π), as the minimum of three LR-increasing functions, is LR-increasing. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 5.2 (Monotonicity of adoption policies for risk neutral or risk seeking DMs). Suppose that the DM is risk neutral or risk seeking and that the signal process satisfies the MLR property. If it is optimal to adopt with prior π 1 , then it is also optimal to adopt with any prior π 2 such that π 2 LR π 1 .
Proof. Because the policy difference G k (π) is LR-increasing (as argued before the proposition), if it is optimal to adopt for π 1 (i.e., G k (π 1 ) = 0), then it is also optimal to adopt for π 2 (i.e.,
If the DM is risk averse (i.e., u(w) is concave), the argument underlying this result breaks down as the utility difference (4) is now decreasing rather than increasing and consequently the reward term (3) is LRdecreasing rather than LR-increasing. We can see the difficulty in the risk-averse case by comparing Figures 1(b) and 2(b). In the risk-neutral case, the difference between adoption and waiting is increasing when moving from left to right in Figure 1(b) . In the risk-averse case in Figure 2 (b), this difference is initially increasing but then decreases.
In the next subsection, we provide an example that demonstrates that the adoption policy need not be monotonic, even with a reasonable utility function. However, we will show in §7 that we will have monotonic policies if we assume the utility function is not "too risk averse." We first note that in the special case where there are only two possible technology values, policies will be monotonic without any special utility assumptions (beyond assuming that u(w) is increasing) or assuming the signal process satisfies the MLR property. In this case, we appeal to the convexity result of Proposition 4.2 rather than increasing difference arguments to establish the monotonicity of the optimal policies.
Proposition 5.3 (Monotonicity of policies with two outcomes). Suppose the DM's utility function is increasing and there are two possible technology values. If it is optimal to adopt with prior π 1 , then it is also optimal to adopt with any prior π 2 such that π 2 LR π 1 . Similarly, if it is optimal to reject with prior π 2 , then it is also optimal to reject with any prior π 1 such that π 2 LR π 1 .
Proof. Let θ and θ h denote the two possible technology values and assume θ < 0 < θ h and let p be the probability associated with θ h and (1 − p) with θ . If 0 ≤ θ , θ h [or 0 ≥ θ , θ h ], given that the utility function is increasing, it would clearly be optimal to adopt [or reject] for any p. With two outcomes, increasing p is an LR-improvement and all possible priors are convex combinations of the priors with p = 0 and p = 1. If it is optimal to adopt with probability p 1 , because it is optimal to adopt with probability p = 1, convexity of the adoption region (Proposition 4.2) implies that it is optimal to adopt with any probability p 2 , such that p 1 ≤ p 2 ≤ 1. A similar argument holds for the rejection result.
One implication of this result is that any example demonstrating the nonmonotonicity of the adoption policy must involve at least three different technology values.
An Example with Nonmonotonic Optimal Policies
We show that adoption policies need not be monotonic by considering the two-period example shown in the decision trees of The DM can adopt or reject immediately or wait and pay $3 to observe a signal x, which may be "positive" The expected utilities are shown below and left of the decision and chance nodes in the decision trees of Figure 3 ; the optimal choices are indicated with bold lines. In Figure 3 (a) with prior π 1 , it is optimal for the DM to adopt immediately. In Figure 3 (b) with prior π 2 , it is optimal for the DM to wait and decide after observing a signal, adopting if the signal is positive and rejecting otherwise. Thus, the optimal policy for this example is not monotonic in the prior: a LR-improvement in the prior -changing from π 1 to π 2 -leads the DM to switch from adopting to waiting.
It is not difficult to understand what is happening in this example. With prior π 1 , there is a 0.08 probability of having the "low" outcome with a technology value of -$20. With an initial wealth of $23.002, this outcome would leave the DM with a wealth of $3.002. If the DM waits and adopts after a positive signal, there is a reduced chance (≈0.03) of this bad outcome. However, taking into account the costs of waiting ($3) in this case the DM is left with a wealth of only $0.002, which is a near disastrous outcome with a logarithmic utility function. However, with prior π 2 , there is no chance of having the low outcome and thus there is no chance of having the near disastrous outcome if the DM waits; in this case, it is optimal to wait.
Here, as we reduce (or eliminate) the probability of the disastrous outcome, we need the intermediate, but
still negative, third outcome to make waiting attractive. In terms of the policy differences (2), the utility difference (4) is large and rapidly decreasing in low wealth states; improving the prior π leads the minimum in (2) to change from being obtained by adopting to being obtained by waiting.
In short, the non-monotonicity of the policy in this case seems quite reasonable and is driven by the extreme risk aversion encountered with bad outcomes (low θ). Following the approach of the previous example, we can construct examples with non-monotonic optimal policies for any utility function that approaches −∞ as w approaches 0. With such a utility function, the costs of gathering information can have a huge impact on the DM's utility in low wealth states. To ensure monotonic polices, we will rule out such behavior by limiting the DM's risk aversion in the states with bad technology outcomes.
s-increasing and sLR-increasing Functions
As discussed in §5 the policy differences G k (w, π) in equation (2) are not necessarily LR-increasing under risk aversion and this can lead to nonmonotonic policies. To establish monotonicity of the policies, we will provide conditions that ensure that these differences will cross at most once as we LR-improve the prior distribution. Unfortunately single crossing is a difficult property to work with in the DP setting. Whereas sums and weighted sums of increasing functions will be increasing, sums and weighted sums of single crossing functions need not be single crossing. Thus, in the DP setting, even if the reward function and continuation value are both single crossing, their sum (or integral) need not be. So we will instead define new properties that are weaker than increasing and LR-increasing but still imply the desired single-crossing properties.
Definition 6.1 (s-increasing functions). Let s(θ) be a scaling function such that s(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ and s(θ) > 0 for some θ and let
Note that if s(θ) > 0 for all θ, s-increasing is equivalent to v(θ)/s(θ) being increasing in θ and sLR-increasing is equivalent to V (π)/S(π) being LR-increasing. If the scaling function s(θ) is a positive constant, s-increasing is equivalent to the ordinary sense of increasing. However, with nonconstant scaling functions, s-increasing functions need not be increasing. Similarly, constant functions need not be s-increasing.
We can think of s-increasing as being short for "sort of" increasing, as the properties of increasing functions that we used to show the policy differences were increasing hold for s-increasing functions as well.
Proposition 6.1 (Properties of s-increasing functions). Given a scaling function s(θ) satisfying the conditions of Definition 6.1:
(i) For any scalar α, αs(θ) and −αs(θ) are both s-increasing.
(ii) If v 1 (θ) and v 2 (θ) are s-increasing, then for any α, β ≥ 0, αv 1 (θ) + βv 2 (θ) is also s-increasing.
(iii) The maximum or minimum of two or more s-increasing functions is also s-increasing.
(iv) Pointwise limits of s-increasing functions are also s-increasing.
(v) Suppose s(θ) is single crossing and v(θ) is s-increasing:
These same properties hold for sLR-increasing functions with V (π) and S(π) replacing v(θ) and s(θ) and
These results are straightforward to prove. Part (i) of the proposition says that functions αs(θ) can be interpreted as "s-constants." Recall from §5.2 that the utility difference (4) was constant in the risk-neutral case but decreasing in the risk-averse case, when we wanted it to be constant or increasing. We will choose a scaling function s(θ) so that this utility differences are s-constant or s-increasing. We then use parts (ii) and (iii) above in a recursive proof to show that the policy differences are sLR-increasing. Parts (ii) and (iv) of Proposition 6.1 imply that s-increasing is a closed convex cone (C3) property in the sense of Smith and McCardle (2002) ; such properties arise frequently and quite naturally in stochastic DPs.
The final part of Proposition 6.1 can be interpreted as a single-crossing result. If s(θ) > 0 for all θ (and thus s(θ) is single crossing), then this reduces to the assertion that an s-increasing function is single crossing, in the same way that an increasing function is single crossing. However, allowing s(θ) to be zero for some θ can provide some additional flexibility, as we will illustrate in the technology adoption model with discounting in §9. In regions where s(θ) = 0, an s-increasing function v(θ) must be nonpositive but no other conditions are placed on v(θ). However, if s(θ) is single crossing and s(θ 0 ) > 0, then the single-crossing condition is "switched on" at θ 0 and v(θ) must be single crossing for θ > θ 0 .
We now show that the analog of Proposition 3.2 holds for s-increasing functions; that is, expectations of s-increasing functions generate sLR-increasing functions and the sLR-increasing property is preserved by Bayesian updating. These results (and the properties of Proposition 6.1) are the key results for establishing monotonic policies in the technology adoption model with risk aversion.
Proposition 6.2 (Properties of sLR-increasing functions). Let s(θ) be a scaling function as in Definition 6.1.
(ii) Suppose the signal process satisfies the MLR property, V (π) is a sLR-increasing function and s is
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
We also note that the result that Bayesian updating preserves the sLR-increasing property (part (ii) above)
generalizes to the setting where θ is changing over time (as in a partially observable Markov decision process), provided these transitions satisfy the MLR property. We discuss this in more detail in the Appendix B.1.
We conclude this section with a brief discussion of properties that are related to s-increasing. First, the definition of s-increasing functions is related to logsupermodularity (see, e.g., Athey (2002) ) which is also referred to as "totally positive of order 2" (see Karlin (1968) ). A nonnegative function f (x) is logsupermodular (or totally positive of order 2) if log f (x) is supermodular. In the case where x = (i, θ) with i ∈ {1, 2} and θ 2 ≥ θ 1 , this is equivalent to requiring
If we take f (1, θ) = s(θ) and f (2, θ) = v(θ), this reduces to the condition defining s-increasing. However, s-increasing, unlike logsupermodularity, does not require v(θ) to be nonnegative. This is important in our application in the technology adoption model because the functions involved may be positive or negative.
Nevertheless the proof of Proposition 6.2 draws on results for totally positive systems.
A second related property is "signed-ratio monotonicity" (SRM) which was introduced in Quah and Strulovici (2012) and is used to aggregate the single crossing property. Specifically, Quah and Strulovici (2012) shows that the weighted sum of two single-crossing functions will be single crossing if and only if the two functions satisfy the SRM condition. They also provide conditions that ensure that the integral of a family of single-crossing functions will be single crossing. However, their conditions for integral aggregation (in their Theorems 1 and 2) are not satisfied in the technology adoption model and we could not apply these results in this setting.
Adoption Policies with Risk Aversion
We now return to the problem of showing that the adoption policies in the technology adoption model with risk aversion have a monotonic structure. Specifically, we will show that, given certain utility assumptions and a particular choice of scaling function s(θ), the difference between the value associated with immediate adoption and the optimal value function, G k (w, π), is sLR-increasing.
Consider the recursive form of the policy difference G k (w, π) given in (2). To show G k (w, π) is sLRincreasing, we will take the scaling function to be utility difference To establish the monotonicity result for adoption policies, we will place assumptions on the DM's utility function to ensure the reward functions associated with waiting and rejecting in (2) are both sLR-increasing.
Proposition 7.1 (Utility conditions). Suppose the DM with utility u(w) exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion, i.e., τ u (w) is increasing. Define w 0 and s(θ) as in (5). Then, for all ∆ ≥ 0:
(ii) u(w 0 + ∆ + θ) − u(w 0 + ∆) is s-increasing if τ u (w 0 + θ − c) ≥ −θ where θ is the smallest possible value of θ (or less than or equal to all possible θ) .
If u(w) exhibits constant absolute risk aversion, then no risk tolerance bound is required in (ii).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The lower bound on the risk tolerance in the assumption of part (ii) -the assumption that the DM is not "too risk averse" -rules out the behavior that leads to nonmonotonic policies in the example of §5.3.
We can now assemble the pieces and show that, given these utility assumptions, G k (w, π) is sLRincreasing and thus the adoption policies are monotonic. The proof proceeds as in the risk-neutral/riskseeking case (Proposition 5.2) but with s-increasing and sLR-increasing properties replacing increasing and LR-increasing.
Proposition 7.2 (Monotonicity of adoption policies with risk aversion). Suppose the assumptions of Proposition 7.1 are satisfied and the signal process satisfies the MLR property. Then, if it is optimal to adopt with prior π 1 , it is also optimal to adopt with any prior π 2 such that π 2 LR π 1 .
Proof. We define the scaling function s(θ) as in Proposition 7.1 and use an induction argument to show that G k (w k , π) is sLR-increasing. For the terminal case, by Proposition 7.1(ii) (with ∆ = 0), u(w 0 + θ) − u(w 0 ) is s-increasing. Then by Proposition 6.2(i), G 0 (w 0 , π) is sLR-increasing. For the inductive step, let w k = w 0 + kc and assume that G k−1 (w k−1 , π) is sLR-increasing. Let us consider the utility differences for the three different possible actions defining G k (w k , π):
(i) Adopting yields 0 which is trivially sLR-increasing.
is then sLR-increasing by Proposition 6.2(i).
(iii) Waiting yields E[ u(w k +θ) − u(w k +θ − c) | π ] plus a continuation value. The function inside the expectation, u(w k + θ) − u(w k + θ − c), is s-increasing by Proposition 7.1(i) (with ∆ = kc); its expecta-
is then sLR-increasing by Proposition 6.2(i). The continuation value
] is sLR-increasing by the induction hypothesis and Proposition 6.2(ii). By Proposition 6.1(ii), the sum of reward and continuation value (both of which are sLR-increasing) is sLRincreasing. Thus the utility difference associated with waiting is sLR-increasing.
Because the minimum of three sLR-increasing functions is also sLR-increasing (Proposition 6.2(iii)), G k (w k , π) is sLR-increasing. Note that S(π) > 0 for all π, because s(θ) > 0; S(π) is thus LR-single crossing. G k (w k , π) is therefore also LR-single crossing (Proposition 6.2(v)). Then if it is optimal to adopt with prior π 1 (i.e., G k (w k , π 1 ) = 0), then, because G k (w, π) is LR-single crossing, we have G k (w, π 2 ) ≥ 0. Of course, G k (w k , π 2 ) ≤ 0 (since adopting yields 0), so we must have G k (w k , π 2 ) = 0 which implies that is optimal to adopt with prior π 2 .
Thus, if the DM is not too risk averse in the states with bad outcomes, we will have policies that are monotonic in π just as in the risk-neutral case and as one might expect to hold more broadly.
How restrictive are these utility conditions? Consider the case of a DM with a power utility u(w) = −w 1−γ where γ ≥ 1 (γ = 1 is the log utility); the risk tolerance is τ u (w) = w/γ. The risk tolerance bound of Proposition 7.1 can then written as
In practice, we would expect the cost of gathering information c to typically be small compared to the amounts at stake in the decision problem. If we take c ≈ 0, then the risk tolerance condition becomes w + (1 + γ)θ ≥ 0 and can be interpreted as requiring the DM to be able to endure losses that are (1 + γ) times the worst possible technology outcome θ, without being bankrupted. A typical value of γ for an individual might range between 2 and 10, so the risk tolerance condition is satisfied for such an individual if the worst possible technology outcome represents less than 1/3 to 1/11 of the DM's wealth.
The risk tolerance bound of Proposition 7.1 can be sharpened given additional information about the utility function. In particular, the right side of the bound (−θ) is based on a first-order linear approximation (from above) where u(w) ≈ u(w + θ) − θu (w + θ); see equation (A9). Since this linear approximation could be exact, we cannot improve the bound without making additional assumptions about the utility beyond it being DARA. However, if we assume a particular form for the utility function, we can improve the bound by calculating the relevant utilities exactly. For instance, if we consider a power utility with γ ranging from 2 to 10 (as above) and assume that the cost c of gathering information is less than 1% of the DM's wealth, the risk tolerance condition is satisfied if the worst possible technology outcome represents less than (approximately)
98.3% (for γ = 2) to 12.7% (for γ = 10) of the DM's wealth (as opposed to 33.3% to 9.1% of the DM's wealth with the original bound). Thus the risk-tolerance bound of Proposition 7.1 is conservative but can be improved given additional information about the utility function.
Changing Risk Attitudes
How do changes in risk tolerance affect policies? Considering the results for the illustrative example in the risk-neutral and risk-averse cases in Figure 2 (a), we see that (i) if it is optimal to adopt in the risk-averse case, it is also optimal to adopt in the risk-neutral case and (ii) if it is optimal to reject in the risk-neutral case, it is optimal to reject in the risk-averse case. These results seem intuitive.
The rejection result is true in general: rejection yields a constant w and thus the certainty equivalent of rejecting is unaffected by changes in risk attitude. In contrast, adopting and waiting, as risky gambles, have larger certainty equivalents for a more risk-tolerant DM. Thus, we have the following.
Proposition 8.1 (Rejection policies with changing risk tolerance). If it is optimal for one DM to reject given prior π, any more risk-averse DM should also reject given the same prior π.
This implies that a risk-averse DM will reject a technology before a less risk-averse or risk-neutral DM, as was the case in the illustrative example, on the sample path shown in Figures 1(a) and 2(a).
As with changing priors, comparing the adopt and wait options with different risk tolerances is more complex as it requires comparing expected utilities or certainty equivalents for adopting and waiting, both of which will change with changes in risk tolerance. It is not too difficult to construct examples like that of §5.3
where increasing risk tolerance leads the DM to switch from adopting to waiting. For instance in the example of Figure 3(a) , with a utility function u(w) = ln(w), as shown there, it is optimal to adopt immediately. If we instead consider the more risk tolerant utility function u(w) = ln(1 + w), it is optimal to wait. Here, as discussed in §5.3, the cost of waiting puts the DM with a log utility in a state with near-zero wealth if the technology value turns out to be bad. However, the more risk tolerant DM with u(w) = ln(1 + w) is less sensitive to this incremental cost and finds waiting more attractive. Thus, we cannot hope for a general result that says increasing risk tolerance encourages adoption.
Can we identify reasonable assumptions on the utility functions -for example, bounds on the risk tolerances as in Proposition 7.1 -that would rule out such counterintuitive examples? The short answer is no, as such examples are not limited to scenarios with extreme risk aversion. To illustrate, again consider payoffs in the simple two-period example of Figure 3 (a). Here we see that gathering information reduces the probability of encountering bad outcomes, but the cost of the information makes the outcomes worse. The fact that the bad outcomes become worse can lead risk-averse DMs to choose not to pay for information in cases where more risk-tolerant DMs will gather information. For example, if we had a DM with a risk-averse utility function who is indifferent between waiting and adopting in the example of Figure 3 (a) (and prefers both waiting and adopting to rejecting), we can construct a more risk-averse utility function that assigns a lower utility to the worst outcome, leaving all other utilities unchanged. The DM with this new utility function would prefer adopting to waiting, despite being more risk averse.
We can however provide a positive result in the special case where we compare the choices of a DM with constant absolute risk aversion (i.e., with an exponential utility function) with those of a risk-neutral DM.
The proof relies heavily on the "∆-property" of the exponential utility function and uses our earlier results on the monotonicity of the optimal policy with respect to changes in the prior.
Proposition 8.2 (Adoption policies for exponential and risk-neutral DMs). Suppose the signal process satisfies the MLR property. If it is optimal for a risk-averse DM with constant absolute risk aversion to adopt given prior π, then a risk-neutral DM should also adopt given the same prior π.
Proof. See Online Appendix B.2.
This result does not generalize to allow comparisons between a DM with an arbitrary risk-averse utility function with a risk-neutral DM. Similarly, one might speculate that the result of Proposition 8.2 would allow comparisons between two DMs with exponential utility functions. That is, one might think that if it is optimal to adopt with an exponential utility function with risk tolerance τ 1 , then it would also be optimal to adopt with an exponential utility function with risk tolerance τ 2 ≥ τ 1 . However, this is not necessarily true. We provide an example that demonstrates this following the proof of Proposition 8.2 in the appendix.
Discounting
So far we have not considered discounting. In practice, discounting may be an important consideration:
information may be inexpensive or free, but time consuming to gather. In these cases, an important "cost" of gathering information is the delay in receiving of the benefit of the technology. In this section, we will consider the model with discounting where, as is typical in the decision analysis literature (see, e.g., Smith
(1998)), the utility function is defined on current wealth plus the net present value (NPV) of the net benefit of the technology; all costs and benefits are discounted back to the present value which is the value with T periods to go. In this formulation, note that both positive and negative benefits are discounted, so delay reduces the risks (in NPV terms) associated with adoption. Discounting poses some new analytic challenges, but they can be addressed using the same tools we used in the case without discounting.
Given a per-period discount factor δ (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1), let δ k = δ T −k denote the discount factor for costs incurred or benefits received with k periods to go. The value function with discounting is then
If δ < 1, we can allow the search cost c to be zero; in the c = 0 case, the reject option will be (weakly) dominated by the option to wait (since it is free to wait), but the DM still faces a tradeoff between the information provided by waiting and the "cost" associated with the delay in receiving the benefits.
In this model with discounting, the results on the monotonicity of the value function (Proposition 4.1) and convexity of the value functions and policies (Proposition 4.2) continue to hold as before. Similarly, the policy results for rejection and adoption under risk-neutrality and with two outcomes continue to hold as before (Propositions 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, respectively). The monotonicity of the adoption policies with risk aversion also continues to hold as before, but we need to be careful with our selection of scaling functions and in defining the utility conditions. The difference between the value associated with immediate adoption and the optimal value function,
, can be written recursively as
. (8) The utility differences associated with waiting in (8) (analogous to the utility differences (4)) are now
where w k = w T − 1−δ k 1−δ c is the NPV of the DM's wealth with k periods to go, after paying the search cost c in all previous periods. Note this utility difference (9) is positive if θ > θ 0 ≡ −c/(1 − δ), but will be negative if θ < θ 0 . In the negative case, the benefit of discounting bad outcomes by one additional period covers the cost of gathering information for that period.
How should we choose a scaling function s(θ) in this setting? For θ ≤ θ 0 , the utility differences g k (θ)
are not positive and increasing in θ; in this region, we will take s(θ) = 0. For θ > θ 0 , we want to choose s(θ) to ensure the utility differences g k (θ) will all be s-increasing. If s(θ) > 0 and g k (θ) and s(θ) are both differentiable, g k (θ) will be s-increasing if and only if
(This follows from differentiating g k (θ)/s(θ) and rearranging.) In §7, we took s(θ) to be the utility difference with 0 periods remaining (g 0 (θ)), because without discounting and with a DARA utility function, this utility difference is decreasing most rapidly at the lowest wealth level (that is, the ratio g k (θ)/g k (θ) on the left in (10) is decreasing in k) and (10) is satisfied for all k. However, with discounting, the most rapidly decreasing utility difference may not be the one at the lowest wealth level. So instead, we explicitly find the most rapidly decreasing term by taking
Then for θ ≥ θ 0 , we define
for some immaterial constant K > 0. Note that this s(θ) is single crossing: s(θ) = 0 for θ ≤ θ 0 and s(θ) > 0 for θ > θ 0 . Also note that if the minimum in (11) is obtained by the same k for all θ (as it was in the case with no discounting), then (12) implies that
With this choice of scaling function, we have the analog of Proposition 7.1 with discounting.
Proposition 9.1 (Utility conditions with discounting). Suppose the DM is risk averse and her utility function u(w) is DARA. Define the scaling function s(θ) as in (12). Then, for all k:
Proof. The proof uses arguments similar to those in the proof of Proposition 7.1 but must take care to handle cases where the s(θ) = 0; see online Appendix B.3.
The monotonicity of the optimal adoption policies follows exactly as in Proposition 7.2.
Proposition 9.2 (Monotonicity of adoption policies with risk aversion and discounting). Suppose the assumptions of Proposition 9.1 are satisfied and the signal process satisfies the MLR property. Then, if it is optimal to adopt with prior π 1 , it is also optimal to adopt with any prior π 2 such that π 2 LR π 1 .
Proof. The proof proceeds exactly as the proof of Proposition 7.2 with s(θ) defined as in (12). However, with the possibility that s(θ) = 0 for some θ, we have to ensure that S(π 1 ) > 0. Here we note that s(θ) = 0 only when θ ≤ θ 0 < 0; otherwise s(θ) > 0. If the support of π 1 were restricted to the range θ ≤ θ 0 , then S(π 1 ) would be zero, but rejecting would be preferred to adopting with this π 1 . Thus the premise that it is optimal to adopt with π 1 implies that S(π 1 ) > 0.
Note that with discounting the "worst possible outcome" θ * k that must be considered in the risk tolerance bound is the better of the lowest possible technology outcome (in NPV terms) δ k θ and θ 0 = −c/(1 − δ).
If information gathering is free (c = 0), then the risk tolerance bound reduces to the trivial requirement
, any degree of risk aversion is fine. In this case, the cost of gathering information cannot have the strong negative impact on the DM's utility, as it did in the example of §5.3. In fact, as discussed earlier, delaying bad (negative) outcomes makes the DM better off. With c > 0 and δ = 1, we have θ 0 = −∞ and the results of Propositions 9.1 and 9.2 reduce to the corresponding results without discounting.
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Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the impact of risk-aversion on information gathering in a technology adoption model. We find that most of the structural properties from the risk-neutral case continue to hold in the riskaverse case: the value functions are increasing and convex and the optimal policies are monotonic provided the DM is not too risk averse in scenarios with bad technology outcomes. We also showed that the riskaverse DM will reject a technology before a risk-neutral DM and, if the DM has a CARA utility function, the risk-averse DM will adopt later than a risk-neutral DM. We hope that the results and examples of the paper will help researchers better understand the interesting and sometimes subtle impacts of risk aversion on information acquisition decisions.
Though the main goal of this paper was to study the technology adoption model under risk aversion, the proof techniques we used may prove useful in other contexts. The s-increasing property is a flexible generalization of the ordinary sense of increasing that is convenient for DPs and partially observable Markov DPs, as sums of s-increasing functions will be s-increasing and the sLR-increasing property survives Bayesian updating. The fact the s-increasing property implies the single-crossing condition may make it useful for studying policies in other DP models. In the technology adoption model, the desired monotonic policy results could not be established using standard increasing difference (supermodularity) arguments. However, given an appropriate scaling function, it was not difficult to show that the relevant policy differences were sincreasing; this then ensures the single-crossing properties required for the desired policy results.
A. Appendix
A.1. Proof of Proposition 6.2
Proof. Proposition 6.2(i) We proceed as follows:
Here, in the third equality, we decompose the region of integration into sets θ 1 < θ 2 and θ 1 > θ 2 . (When θ 1 = θ 2 , the integrand is zero.) In the fourth equality, we convert the second set into the first by changing variables θ 1 → θ 2 and θ 2 → θ 1 . Rearranging gives the fifth equality. Here, the (a) term is nonnegative because v is s-increasing and the (b) term is nonnegative because π 2 LR π 1 . The final inequality then follows and V (π) is sLR-increasing.
Proposition 6.2(ii)
The proof of Proposition 6.2(ii) is analogous to a result of Karlin (1968, Chapter 3 Theorem 5.1) . However, our assumptions are different from Karlin's and the proof has some important differences. We comment on these differences following the proof.
Proof. We first consider the case where S(π 1 ) = 0. Since s(θ) is assumed to be single-crossing in θ, by Proposition 3.3, S(π) is LR-single-crossing. By Proposition 6.1(v)(a), we have V (π 1 ) ≤ 0. Then, since S(π 2 ) ≥ 0, we have V (π 1 )S(π 2 ) ≤ V (π 2 )S(π 1 ) = 0, as desired. For the remainder of the proof, we assume that S(π 1 ) > 0, which implies S(π 2 ) > 0, since π 2 LR π 1 and S(π) is LR-single crossing.
Because S(π) is linear in π, we know E[ S(Π(π,x)) | f (π) ] = S(π). Then the desired result is equivalent to
To simplify notation, we let V ij = V (Π(π i , x j )), S ij = S(Π(π i , x j )), and f ij = f (x j ; π i ). Our standing assumption that L(x|θ) > 0 for all θ and x ensures that f ij > 0 and the posterior distributions Π(π i , x j ) in V ij and S ij are well defined. Our assumption that S(π 1 ) > 0 (and hence S(π 2 ) > 0) implies the priors have some mass in the region where s(θ) > 0, which implies the posteriors ensures that Π(π i , x j ) will as well; this implies S ij > 0. We can then rewrite (A1) as 
Here, in the third equality, we decompose the region of integration into sets x 1 < x 2 and x 1 > x 2 and x 1 = x 2 . (The set x 1 = x 2 will have zero mass with continuous distributions, but may have positive mass with discrete or more general distributions.) In the fourth equality, we convert the second set into the first by changing variables x 1 → x 2 and x 2 → x 1 . We also rewrite the third integral taking into account the restriction to the set x 1 = x 2 and substituting x 2 → x 1 . Each of the terms identified in the fifth expression above is nonnegative. Terms (e) and (g) are nonnegative because each term in the product is nonnegative. For (a), (c), (d) and (f), nonnegativity follows from the fact that V is sLR-increasing (as shown in Proposition 6.2(i)) which implies V i2,j2 /S i2,j2 ≥ V i1,j1 /S i1,j1 whenever (i 2 , j 2 ) ≥ (i 1 , j 1 ). Unpacking the notation, this is equivalent to
where Π(π i1 , x j1 ) LR Π(π i1 , x j1 ) whenever (i 2 , j 2 ) ≥ (i 1 , j 1 ), i.e., the posteriors are LR-dominant whenever the priors are LR-dominant and/or the signals are higher.
Nonnegativity of (b) is equivalent to showing that S ij f ij is log-supermodular in (i, j). Unpacking the notation and using Bayes' rule, this is equivalent to:
In the third equality, we cancel the predictive distributions f (x i ; π j ) with the denominators in the posterior distributions. The final inequality is equivalent to
being log-supermodular in (i, j), which can be established using the "basic composition formula" for logsupermodular functions (see, e.g., (Karlin, 1968) ). By assumption L(x i |θ) is log-supermodular in (x i , θ) (this is equivalent to the monotone likelihood assumption) and π j (θ) is log-supermodular in (j, θ) (this is equivalent to assuming π 2 LR π 1 ). Taking the measure to be (s(θ)dθ), the basic composition formula then implies that (A2) is log-supermodular or, equivalently, that the inequality above holds. This implies the (b) term above is nonnegative, thereby completing the proof.
We now comment on the differences between this proof and that of Karlin (1968, Chapter 3 Theorem 5.1) . First, Karlin requires the functions V and S to be positive. However V appears only in the numerator and ultimately only in the form of differences (in terms (a), (c), (d) and (h) above) and negative values for V do not cause difficulties. Second, Karlin assumes that S ij and V ij are both log-supermodular in (i, j). This is not assumed here and indeed may not be true in our setting. Specifically, Karlin uses the assumption that S ij is log-supermodular in (i, j) to show term (b) above is nonnegative. We show (b) is nonnegative using the fact the likelihoods and denominators of the posterior distributions cancel; this then reduces the problem to a setting where we can use the basic composition formula to show (b) is nonnegative.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 7.1
We want to show h(θ) is increasing. Taking the derivative of h and rearranging, we find that h(θ) is increasing if
For ∆ = 0, (A4) holds trivially with equality. For ∆ > 0, (A4) is implied by the assumption that u exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion. To see this, define f (u) = u (u −1 (u)) (the inverse is well defined since u is assumed to be strictly increasing) and note that f (u) = −ρ u (u −1 (u)), which is assumed to be increasing. Thus f (u) is convex. We can rewrite (A4) as
where u 2 = u(w 0 + ∆ + θ), u 1 = u(w 0 + ∆ + θ − c), u 4 = u(w 0 + θ), and u 3 = u(w 0 + θ − c). Note that u 2 > u 1 , u 4 > u 3 , u 2 > u 4 , and u 1 > u 3 . Thus we can interpret (A5) as a comparison of slopes of two chords of a convex function, with the chord for the left term involving larger values (u 2 , u 1 ) than the chord for the right (u 4 , u 3 ). Since f is a convex function, the slopes of these chords are increasing with larger values; thus (A5) holds.
(ii) To show u(w 0 + ∆ + θ) − u(w 0 + ∆) is s-increasing, let
We want to show this h(θ) is increasing. Note that the denominator is positive and decreasing (since u is increasing and concave). If θ ≥ 0, the numerator in (A6) is nonnegative and increasing in θ (since u is increasing). Thus, if θ ≥ 0, h(θ) is increasing. Now assume that θ < 0. Taking the derivative of h and rearranging, we find that h(θ) is increasing if
As in the proof of part (i) of this proposition, the term on left of (A7) can be interpreted as the slope of a chord of the convex function f (u) = u (u −1 (u)), taken at points u 2 = u(w 0 + θ), u 1 = u(w 0 + θ − c), where u 2 > u 1 . Since f is convex, the derivative of the function f , f (u) = −ρ u (u −1 (u)), evaluated at the smaller value u 1 must be less than than the slope of this chord. Thus we have:
Now consider the right side of (A7). Using a Taylor series expansion of u at w 0 + ∆ + θ, we can write
where w 0 + ∆ + θ ≤ w * 0 ≤ w 0 + ∆ (recall that we are considering the case where θ < 0). We can then write the right side of (A7) as:
where the inequality follows because u is assumed to be concave (thus u (w * 0 ) ≤ 0). Combining (A8) and (A10), we see that (A7) holds if −ρ u (w 0 + θ − c) ≥ 1 θ or, equivalently, if τ u (w 0 + θ − c) ≥ −θ. Given that the risk tolerance τ u (w) is assumed to be increasing, we can check this risk tolerance bound by considering θ, the smallest possible value of θ, as stated in Proposition 7.1(b).
We can verify that the desired results hold with utility functions u exhibiting constant absolute risk aversion, i.e., u(w) = − exp(−w/τ ), directly by differentiating the functions h(θ) defined in (A3) and (A6).
We obtain the numerical results for the power utility by calculating the right side of (A7) exactly (with θ = θ and comparing to ρ u (w 0 + θ − c).
B. Online Appendix
B.1. Comment on Proposition 6.2(ii)
The result of Proposition 6.2(ii) generalizes to the setting where the underlying state θ (here the benefit of technology) is changing over time (as in a partially observed Markov decision process), provided the state transitions satisfy the MLR property. Let θ k denote the state variable in period k and let ν(θ k−1 |θ k ) denote the transition probabilities for θ k−1 conditional on the current period state θ k . The prior on next period's state is then:
and the signal and posterior distributions are then given by
If we assume that the technology transitions, as well as the signal process, satisfy the MLR property:
k and k, then the next-period prior η(π), predictive distribution for signals f (π), and posteriors Π(π, x) are all LR improving with LR improvements in the prior π for the current period. These results follow from Proposition 3.1. The proof of Proposition 6.2(ii) proceeds as before, except in (A2) (and the preceding inequality) we have the prior on the next period state η(θ; π i ) in place of π i (θ); the same argument then applies.
B.2. Proof of Proposition 8.2
In this section, we focus on the case where the utility function is an exponential u(w) = − exp(−w/R) and define the certainty equivalent as CE(u) = −R ln(−u). Also recall the "delta property" for exponential utilities:
We prove Proposition 8.2 with the aid of the following lemma.
Lemma B.1. With an exponential utility function and a signal process that satisfies the MLR property,
is LR-increasing.
Proof. Note that -increasing and CE(u) is an increasing function. The adoption term (0) is trivially LR-increasing. Because minimum of three LR-increasing functions is LR-increasing, we can complete the proof by showing the wait term above is also LR-increasing. From Proposition 7.2, we know that
is LR-increasing. Dividing the denominator by e −(w0−w)/R , we get that
is LR-increasing. With an exponential utility function, this ratio is equal to
.
Because (1 − e c R ) < 0, we then have that
is LR-increasing. Then
is LR-increasing because ln(u) is an increasing function.
Let V k (π) be the risk-neutral value function, i.e., given by taking u(w) = w. In this case, the value function is independent of wealth and can be written recursively as
The following proposition implies Proposition 8.2 in the text.
Proposition B.1. Let V k (π) be the risk-neutral value function, i.e., given by taking u(w) = w. Then, for a risk-averse exponential utility function and a signal process that satisfies the MLR property, we have
Proof. We have (as in the proof above)
and
For both the certainty equivalent difference (A11) and expected value difference (A12), the terminal cases (k = 0) reduce to the reject cases. We will show that (A10) holds using an induction argument. In the terminal case, we want to show that
This holds because the certainty equivalent for a risk-averse utility function is less than the expected value.
For the induction hypothesis, assume, for any w and π,
We will show that each component of (A11) is less than the corresponding component of (A12). This is trivially true for the adopt option. For the reject options, this follows from the fact that the certainty equivalent is less than the expected value, as in the terminal case. So we need to study the wait case and show that
Using the ∆-property for the exponential utility, we can subtract c from both sides of (A13) and (A13) is equivalent to
Since taking expectations over the posteriors is equivalent to taking expectations with the prior, this (and (A13)) is equivalent to:
Now consider the gambles involved on the left side of (A14). Let
and o(x) = CE(U k−1 (w +θ − c, Π(π, x))) .
These are the certainty equivalents for adopting (a(x)) and following the optimal strategy (o(x)) conditioned on observing the signal x. The difference in certainty equivalents on the left side of (A14) can then be rewritten as:
Given a signal x, because o(x) follows an optimal strategy whereas a(x) assumes adoption, we know that a(x) ≤ o(x) for each x. Thus the gamble a(x) (with random signal) is first-order stochastically dominated by o(x) and the certainty equivalent difference δ defined in (A15) must satisfy δ ≤ 0. Using the ∆-property of the exponential utility, we then have
so the risk-averse DM is indifferent between the gambles a(x) − δ and o(x). From Lemma B.1, we know that the difference a(x) − o(x) is decreasing in x. Thus the cumulative distribution functions for a(x) − δ and o(x), call them F a−δ (x) and F o (x), cross at most once. Given that the risk-averse DM is indifferent between these two gambles, the cumulative distributions for two gambles must cross exactly once. Furthermore, since δ ≤ 0, we know that a(x) − δ is "more prone to low outcomes" than o(x) (Hammond 1974) , i.e., F o (x) − F a−δ (x) is first negative then turns positive. Then, from Hammond (1974) or Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) , we know that a risk-neutral decision maker would prefer a(x) − δ to o(x), so 0 = CE ( E[ u(a(x) 
Using the ∆-property again, we have
Finally, from the induction hypothesis, for any signal x, we have a(x) − o(x) = CE( E[ u(w +θ − c) | Π(π, x) ]) − CE(U k−1 (w +θ − c, Π(π, x)))
Using this and (A17), we then have
The first inequality follows from (A17) and the second from (A18) and taking expectations. Thus we have established (A14), thereby completing the proof.
One might speculate that the result of Proposition 8.2 might apply to two exponential utility functions, that is, if it is optimal to adopt with an exponential utility function with risk tolerance τ 1 , then it is also optimal to adopt with an exponential utility function with risk tolerance τ 2 ≥ τ 1 . However, this is not true. Specifically, given the data of Table A .1 in a simple two-period problem (i.e., the DM can wait for one period) and a cost c = 0.05 associated with waiting, we find that for risk tolerances less than ≈0.33, it is optimal to quit immediately. For risk tolerances between ≈0.33 and ≈0.58, it is optimal to adopt immediately. For risk tolerances between ≈0.59 and ≈23, it is optimal to wait. For risk tolerances greater than 24, it is optimal to adopt. Thus, the optimal policies may be non-monotonic with increasing risk tolerances, even within the exponential utility family. Proof. (i) For for θ ≤ θ 0 , we have s(θ) = 0 and g k (θ) ≤ 0, so g k (θ) is s-increasing in this range. For θ > θ 0 , we have s(θ) > 0 and want to show that
is increasing for each k. Taking the derivative of h k and rearranging, we find that h k (θ) is increasing if
(This is analogous to (A4) in the proof without discounting.) By construction of s(θ) in equations (11) and (12), we have for all k,
Thus (A20) holds for all θ > θ 0 .
(ii) We want to show that, given the risk tolerance bound of the proposition, a k (θ) ≡ u(w k + δ k θ) − u(w k ) is s-increasing. We will consider three cases: (a) θ < θ 0 < 0, (b) 0 < θ, and (c) θ 0 < θ < 0.
(a) If θ < θ 0 < 0, s(θ) = 0 and a(θ) ≤ 0 and is thus s-increasing in this range.
(b) If 0 < θ, then s(θ) > 0 and we want to show that
is increasing for all k. If θ ≥ 0, s(θ) is positive and decreasing (since u is increasing and concave) and a k (θ) is positive and increasing in θ (since u is increasing). Thus if θ ≥ 0, then h k (θ) is increasing and a k (θ) is s-increasing in this range.
(c) Now assume that θ 0 < θ < 0, which implies s(θ) > 0. Taking the derivative of h k (θ) and rearranging, we find that h k (θ) is increasing if
for all k. (This is analogous to (A7).) We work on the left side of (A23) first. From (11), we know
(We are subtracting a larger number in the numerator, hence the inequality.) Now, using the DARA assumption as in the proof without discounting, i.e., as in (A8), we have
Thus, the left side of (A23) satisfies
Following the same argument as in the case without discounting (using the Taylor series approximation), the right side of (A23) satisfies
Combining (A26) and (A27), we have
Thus the necessary condition (A23) holds if min k −δ k ρ u (w k + δ k−1 θ − δ k c) ≥ 1 θ or, equivalently, if τ u (w k + δ k−1 θ − δ k c) ≥ −δ k θ for all k. Since u(w) is assumed to be DARA (i.e., τ u (w) is increasing), we need only check this condition at the minimum possible value of θ.
